Despite the powerful criticisms of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76)-e.g., that the evidence is compatible with a large number of hypotheses, such as polytheism or a god of limited power, that are as plausible as or more plausible than monotheism-the argument from design continued to be very popular in the 19th century. We, Christians, have signed a civilizational contract that for two thousand years has prohibited us from accessing the idea of God through reason alone, as the Greeks and Romans had taught us, and which instead requires our adherence to the Jews’ “revelation” that God is the god of Israel. This approach has been made necessary for two primary reasons. 8 However, this approach had a boomerang effect. This was particularly true in smaller urban areas starting in the 1990s, as a more conservative approach to Islam gained ground in Syria, and beyond that the Middle East. That is why religious networks based in the Gulf came to be heavily involved in the Syrian conflict, supporting such powerful Salafi rebel groups as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam.17 The funding they provided to armed groups allowed these groups to gain sway over local religious figures and control more mosques, although their influence typically remained confined to the restricted areas in which they operated.

Throughout the 1990s, the role of mosques and religious authorities in Syria changed radically, particularly in urban areas with a population of under 100,000 prople. The role of important families in financing the construction of mosques was a key factor in creating a more decentralized religious environment outside major cities. These towns emerged as important hubs of Islam, complementing cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Their theological foundations came from the four religious schools of Islamic jurisprudence that emerged over the seventh and eighth centuries. In 1962, Sheikh Ahmad al-Hosari established the Imam al-Nawawi Institute of Jurisprudence in Idlib Governorate.9 Initially part of a charity organization that aimed to help the poor, the institute had the authority to issue certificates allowing students to become imams or khatibs, meaning those entitled to deliver sermons in mosques.10 Yet the Hosari institute faced increasing oversight from the security agencies during the first decade of this century. There were also ties based on ideology, namely with regard to the types of Islamic jurisprudence that schools practiced.

However, he was chosen because of his strong ties with the businessman. Because of their close ties to the regime, the businessmen were able to expand their influence and patronage power in the religious field, which also allowed them to gain financially. The increased localism of the Syrian conflict would not only have an impact on groups opposed to the Syrian regime, but also on the regime itself. However, localism was not the sole factor that lessened the state’s sway over the Islamic field. This imbued local religious institutions with a more Salafi outlook, disconnecting them from their Sufi past and breaking up the religious field. Historically, the Syrian state has managed Islamic affairs through traditional centers of Sufi doctrine located in Aleppo and Damascus. In 1817, New York state officially adopted a yearly Thanksgiving day, and some other states followed suit. Most importantly, they provided an avenue for figures with little or no connection to the state to be appointed to positions of authority, solely on the basis of their local appeal. It involves the complicity of state officials in the security sector and religious establishment, and has become an avenue for corruption and the distribution of patronage.

The personal data must be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject. To become a member a candidate had to be Syrian and at least twenty years old, with no legal action pending against him or her. Conditions changed significantly after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising. That is why when the uprising broke out in 2011, the religious environment in many parts of Syria favored the emergence of groups whose interpretation of Islam differed greatly from what had prevailed before. While the driving force of the uprising tended to be local, it was gradually taking place in a context of broader regional rivalries. Therefore, the regime has decentralized authority into the hands of reliable local religious actors while also maintaining leverage over them. Only time will tell whether the regime is able to put in place a more permanent system. Some of the militants gradually returned to Syria, especially following the spike in sectarian killings in Iraq in 2007. At that stage the regime began cracking down on newly radicalized preachers and instituted stricter supervision over religious education. In official propaganda it was said that no leader had supported the construction of mosques as had then president Hafez al-Assad following the “corrective movement” that brought him to power in 1970.1 This claim contributed significantly to Assad’s legitimacy.