”; analogously, we lack any positive idea of a God with infinite attributes, and understand by “God” only the cause of the world (Hobbes, Citizen, 15.14; Leviathan, 31.15). Attempts to ascribe further positive attributes to God are rejected as anthropomorphism (Hobbes, Human Nature, 11.3; Leviathan, 31.25-28; Citizen, 15.14). Clearly, then, Hobbes employs his empiricist principles to emphasize the “narrow limits of our phantasy,” putting knowledge of a God with infinite attributes beyond the scope of human understanding. Since a priori any thing may cause any thing, it follows that even if we had an idea of a perfect being there would be no basis for the claim that God must be the source of this idea. Add to this, our Moon is the perfect size and distance from the Earth for its gravitational pull. Beyond this, we have no experience at all of its cause. In this case our experience of the constant conjunction of Xs/Ys enables us to draw the inference to Xn, the unobserved cause of Yn.

The first is the causal maxim: Whatever exists must have a cause or ground for its existence. It is evident that the foundations of this argument rest with the related causal principles that everything must have a cause or ground for its existence and that no effect can have any perfection that is not also in its cause. Just as Hume rejects the claim that it is absurd or contradictory to deny that there must be a cause for everything that comes into existence, he also denies that it is impossible for an effect to have perfections that its cause lacks. It is impossible, on this account, “that any effect should have any perfection, which was not in the cause”. Finally, Hume’s against the notion of necessary existence have obvious relevance also for Descartes’s effort, in Meditations III, to prove that God necessarily exists by way of reasoning from our (innate) idea of God.

In this way, it is Philo’s position that all we know about God is that he exists (qua cause of the universe) but beyond this we have no idea or understanding of his nature or attributes. You probably know how important food is in Christian tradition, but it may surprise you that the practice of hiding lucky tokens in classic holiday dishes has been popular for centuries. In the late 17th and early 18th centuries this principle was turned against the Epicurean atheism of thinkers such as Lucretius and his modern counterparts. Shamanism in ancient Korea was a religion of fear and superstition, but for modern generations, it remains a colorful and artistic ingredient of their culture. Unfortunately, these prejudices remain rampant in different forms even in this modern age. The defenders of this argument have often claimed that it is so obvious and convincing that even sceptics cannot seriously doubt or deny it (D,3.7/154, 12.2/214). The argument from design is discussed by Hume in Section XI of the first Enquiry and, at greater length, in the Dialogues (Parts II-VIII, XII). The structure of this argument seems clear.

It is also clear that Washington was a humanitarian. In this section Hume emphasizes the point that God’s being is “so different, and so much superior” to human nature that we are not able to form any clear or distinct idea of his nature and attributes, much less one based on our own qualities and characteristics. The importance of this for the argument from design is clear. Hume’s most explicit assault on the cosmological argument appears in Part IX of his Dialogues. On the contrary, neglecting this topic, in face of the ongoing debate and its obvious relevance for Hume’s philosophy in the Treatise, could be a way of suggesting a (strong) sceptical message. Given the prominence of the copy-principle in Hume’s philosophical system, and its obvious relevance to the debate concerning our idea of God, it is surprising to find that in the Treatise Hume barely mentions our idea of God, much less provides any detailed account of the nature and origin of this idea.