Rather than the world existing necessarily in a Neoplatonic sense, it exists by the will of God alone. The reestablishment of regime control is likely to lead to dynamics that consolidate the changes in Syria’s Islamic field-albeit ones the regime will seek to turn to its advantage. It was a stark contrast to the religious centralization previously imposed under the regime. That is why religious networks based in the Gulf came to be heavily involved in the Syrian conflict, supporting such powerful Salafi rebel groups as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam.17 The funding they provided to armed groups allowed these groups to gain sway over local religious figures and control more mosques, although their influence typically remained confined to the restricted areas in which they operated. These three approaches rose and fell depending on the groups wielding political and military power in particular areas, who themselves were influenced and sustained by often competing foreign backers. In certain circumstances, some organisations are allowed to provide welfare services only to people of a particular religion or belief.

These troubles are better than those. Are projects completed in a frenzy of last-minute work? Salinger’s work. She also noted that J.D. It was sometimes a struggle for armed groups to spread more radical versions of Islam. Even if local families represented an obstacle to more radical groups in places, religious figures with charisma and local legitimacy also served as powerful spokesmen for more radical versions of Islam. This fragmentation of the religious landscape would have major repercussions on the dynamics of conflict, creating spaces for outside actors to intervene through local armed groups with a religious identity. As a result of this, armed groups frequently entered into conflict with one another, creating valuable openings for the Assad regime. As the fighting between the two opposition groups continued and regime forces advanced toward Kfar Batna, a number of civilians and armed rebels gathered around Dafdaa as he began communicating with the regime. Later, the name Dafdaa, which means “frog” in Arabic, was used by regime foes to describe opposition members who had switched sides. This American style of democracy is called the “presidential model,” since the president is the chief executive and is not elected at the same time as members of Congress.

Both entities included notables, members of prominent families, and merchants. As of early 2019, the Qubaysiyat was running its activities in three mosques in al-Tall-the Moaz bin Jabal, Fardus, and Noor Mosques.30 This demonstrated how the regime has reasserted itself through friendly local institutions and families rather than by simply attempting to impose central authority over the religious sphere. In practice, Ibāḍī-Sunnī relations were very friendly and Sunnī scholars were among the sultans’ closest confidants. Thanks to his relations with the regime’s security agencies, Shammo was also able to help bring individuals back into good standing with the state, in a process described by the authorities as a “regularization of status” (taswiyet awdaa). The idea of imposing centralized control over all areas that have been taken back from the opposition is not realistic when the Syrian state and its security institutions are still suffering from manpower problems and are being rebuilt. The collective impact of these developments-the localization of religious institutions and imams, the concomitant loosening of state control over the religious sphere, mainly outside Syria’s larger cities, and the arrival of Salafi influences from the Gulf-all contributed to a more decentralized Islam after 2000. This permitted a more conservative interpretation of Islam to take hold at the local level, due to the relative decline in the influence of state-sponsored Islam and, therefore, the ability of the state to push back against doctrines it considered threatening.

However, localism was not the sole factor that lessened the state’s sway over the Islamic field. By the time the Syrian uprising began, therefore, the heightened localism of Islamic institutions outside Syria’s major cities had to an extent reduced central state control over the religious field. Indeed, the factions were rarely able to disrupt local families’ control over mosques, the appointment of imams, and ideology. Al-Tall also provides an example of how, once the conflict had ended there, the regime expanded local religious networks in towns it had recaptured to consolidate its hold over religious institutions. For centuries, boughs were scattered over floors of churches and houses during winter, providing a clean, scented covering. The Reformation period saw an emphasis on divine sovereignty over human affairs as a corollary to its emphasis on fallen humanity’s inability to achieve a right standing with God. They were like witnesses to the same God but from different angles. At the same time this will leave religious institutions in opposition areas outside the framework of Syria’s official Islamic institutions, where they will remain more radical and isolated-their radicalism employed to discredit the official religious establishment. No real proof has been forthcoming supporting any of these theories, and should there still be an interest in Irises in another 200 years not much will have changed regarding the current status of I.albicans.