According to a former member of Ansaroul Islam, the denigrating actions of security forces convinced Dicko and others who joined Ansaroul Islam to stage an attack. In December 2016, Dicko and some 30 armed men attacked a military outpost in Nassoumbou, a village near the Malian border in Soum, killing 12 Burkinabe soldiers. Moreover, at the request of the Burkinabe government, the French also conducted strikes in Burkina Faso in October 2018. While Burkinabe security forces may have not reestablished control of all parts of Soum, the increased presence of security forces along the Malian and Burkinabe border have complicated the activities of groups like Ansaroul Islam. In 2013, French troops arrested Dicko near Tessalit, in the extreme north of Mali, and he was transported to and detained in Bamako. Furthermore, the growing presence of Burkinabe security forces in the northern provinces of the country coupled with the increased operational presence of French military forces under Operation Barkhane in Central Mali likely contributed to a more challenging operational environment for Ansaroul Islam. To counter this, security forces and the government will need to collaborate more closely with local populations, recognizing that while many Burkinabe citizens have been victims of militant Islamist activities, they may also distrust the state and its representatives.

Such constructive efforts by the Burkinabe government may have helped to undermine local support for Ansaroul Islam by countering their narrative of state marginalization and abandonment. Ansaroul Islam targets state representatives, security and defense forces, and public schools to reinforce its narrative of state abandonment, but it has also targeted civilians in more than half of its activities, suggesting that it never fully gained deep local support. This may help explain why Ansaroul Islam targeted traditional leaders, and others of a higher social status, who opposed the militant Islamist group’s ideology. This message appealed most broadly among those of lower social status, which in Soum consisted primarily of young Fulani herdsmen and Rimaibe (a Fulani caste status indicating a lineage to former Fulani slaves). While Ansaroul Islam is believed to be predominately Fulani, this is likely a byproduct of regional demographics (Soum is roughly 90 percent Fulani) rather than a concerted strategy to create a specifically Fulani militant group.

The perceived link between the Fulani community and Ansaroul Islam, for example, has contributed to a push from local populations in the surrounding area to enact vigilante justice. These alleged crimes, which took place as security forces attempted to respond to the threats posed by Ansaroul Islam, validate the narratives of grievance circulated by militant Islamists. It is critical that the government deploy a clear strategy to counter the divisive narratives used by terrorists. This initiative requires renewed government support and resources to promote social mediation and bring communal leaders together to denounce the activities of Ansaroul Islam and other militant Islamist groups. Instead of appealing to ethnic identity, Dicko sought to tap into local frustrations and a sense of inequality felt by many individuals in the north to establish local support. Not all theists resonate with her bold claim that God is a person who has emotions, but many allow that (at least in some analogical sense) God may be see as personal and having affective states. These militias were blamed for the January 1, 2019, Yirgou massacre in which at least 49 Fulani were killed in a reprisal attack for their alleged association with jihadists. The Association of Religion Data Archives.

Whether part of an intentional strategy or a byproduct of the perceived association of Fulani herders with Ansaroul Islam, the latter has effectively pitted the different communities of Burkina Faso against one another and contributed to a weakening of the country’s national cohesion. These types of intercommunal tensions exacerbate the overall security situation in the country and risk further dividing communities that historically coexisted peacefully. To date, the observatory has had limited impact and has failed to prevent the acceleration of tensions and violence between ethnic groups. Consequently, Ansaroul Islam may have lost its limited support within local communities, particularly following the death of its charismatic leader. A concerted and sustained security presence which operates in partnership with local customary and religious leaders can disrupt militant Islamist activities and discourage local support. The growing threat of intercommunal violence now needs to be addressed by authorities and communal leaders as it risks unraveling the social tolerance that has typified Burkina Faso. Ansaroul Islam is now estimated to have no more than a few hundred active fighters and a network of informants and logistical supporters located between the villages of Boulkessi and Ndaki in Soum Province. The Exodus: six hundred horses? Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving Ansaroul Islam in 2018 and the first six months of 2019. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish perpetrators of the events.