Continue to perceive the true nature of the unity of God through this strategy with a patient on several occasions, and frankly. True nature of creator can not be created by the creation of its creator. Sagittarians are known for their optimistic, free-spirited, and often blunt nature. Perhaps given that the Muslim Brotherhood is by and large a “working-within-the-system” movement, the limits (but also opportunities) of activism and influence within an authoritarian parliamentary monarchy are quite conducive to the movement (as opposed to attempts to topple the system through armed struggle as in Syria or attempts at governing alone as in Egypt). Most politicians and activists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon reject attempts to redraw the map of the region, but the vanishing borders and the emergence of new areas of influence based on sectarian and ethnic identities are a growing existential challenge. Also, I likely overestimated in my paper the degree to which the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood look to their Moroccan brethren to judge how well they are doing in the international Brotherhood firmament, although the timing and content of reforms suggests that the Jordanian regime did look, to some extent, toward developments in Morocco before acting. It remains to be seen to what degree ties with secular political blocs enhance or hinder the Brotherhood’s ability to promote reform.

The degree to which Brotherhood groups in different countries vary in terms of their political stances and means of mobilization is striking and has become clearer after participating in the June 2015 “Rethinking Political Islam” workshop. In Kuwait, the Brotherhood has deepened cooperation with secular members of the opposition as a means of advancing its program for a constitutional monarchy, rather than maintaining their strictly Islamist social agenda. The Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco, like the Brotherhood in Kuwait and Jordan, has compartmentalized hizb and haraka, while in Tunisia Ennahda has moved away from social service provision almost entirely, as the group’s opponents maligned the practice as a means of buying electoral support. This reaction paper makes four points, two of which are ways in which reading the other country cases and participating in the June 2015 workshop made me think differently about Islamist movements in Jordan, my country of focus. These, like Jordan, were largely examples of Islamists failing to transcend salient cleavages. My paper provides a sense of the religious and political networks surrounding each of these two parties, including (a) a network of independent schools functioning largely as private businesses (with each network competing with state schools and other private schools for students); (b) various dawa (religious education) organizations affiliated with ideologues from each group as well as mass-based movements like the (Sunni Deobandi) Tablighi Jama’at; and (c) militant proxy groups operating in places like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Kashmir, and Afghanistan.

The 2015 split within the group initiated by the Zamzam Initiative reflects long-growing divides between Palestinian-Jordanian Islamists and Transjordanian Islamists that preceded the Arab Spring. Most studies of the Muslim Brotherhood, including my own work on the Brotherhood in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), focus on specific country cases, treating each branch or affiliate of the Brotherhood as a distinct organization. In a similar way, the Jordanian Brotherhood worked alongside other members of the opposition through the Higher Coordination Committee of the Jordanian Opposition Parties, in an effort to push more effectively for broad-ranging political reform during the 2000s. The Jordanian Brotherhood, like the Kuwaiti Brotherhood, has remained vocal about its demands for a constitutional monarchy. Kaledu Senelis visits homes in Lithuania in the overnight hours between Dec. 24 and Dec. 25, leaving gifts for family members under a Christmas tree. It is interesting to find, through discussions with Brotherhood members in particular from Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey, how electoral success became a kind of all-encompassing goal, while social activities receded to the background. A second significant issue facing Brotherhood-inspired movements throughout the Middle East and Asia concerns the extent to which they privilege contesting elections over other activities, such as the provision of social welfare.

Certainly, the Qatari case, wherein the Brotherhood formally disbanded itself in 1999, proves that a structured organisation is not required for the Brotherhood to hold political sway, particularly in terms of influencing the government’s social policies. Some scientists fear this new technology will be put to use before all the kinks are ironed out, and many have called on the scientific community to hold an international discussion on the ethical implications of mind reading. The Darkness enacts its will upon others, agents that do its bidding, including the Vex and the Hive. He says, among other things, that: God has emotions but they are not controlled by anything outside himself, he takes into account the ultimate good that will come from suffering, suffering does not make love more admirable, a God who suffers would be more appropriately an object of pity than of worship, justice does not require passibility because it need not be based on emotion; and omniscience does not require passibility because God need know only that a person has an emotion, he does not need to experience it. If anyone tries to log in from a different computer they need to have my cell phone as it will ask for a confirmation code which is sent by text.